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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
FAILURE OF MOTORIST TO STOP AFTER STRIKING PEDESTRIAN AS

N CIVIL SUIT.-In a recent Connecticut
civil action, the plaintiff's case was based on the claim that the
decedent, while crossing a public highway in Bridgeport on
foot, was struck by an automobile driven in a careless, reckless,
and negligent manner by the defendant. The body was dragged
for a considerable distance before it fell to the roadway and
thereafter the defendant failed to slacken the pace of his vehicle
or to stop. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and, on
the trial, the defendant failed to take the stand to testify. It
was alleged that the defendant was negligent in that the car
was operated at an unreasonable and unnecessary speed having
regard to the use and condition of travel on the highway.
The highest court of the state was called upon to review
certain instructions given by the trial judge and the reported
opinion held that "defendant's conduct in striking deceased and
knowingly carrying her a long distance on the front of the car,
not only failing to stop but speeding away and escaping without
any attempt to ascertain the result of what he had done, the
EVIDENCE OF GUILT
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extent of her injuries, or to render any assistance, was reprehensible to the last degree and merited the severest condemnation. The jury is entitled to entertain certain presumptions and
draw certain inferences of fact from such conduct in the nature
of an admission against the defendant pointing towards his
guilt.'
This case raises the very interesting and vital question as to
whether or not a jury in a civil suit-may draw an inference of
guilt from the fact that a person was known to have fled from
the scene of an accident. The question of flight as an admission of guilt has never been raised in any other reported civil
case which the writer has been able to find. This surprising
lack of precedent is further evidenced by the fact that the Connecticut court in deciding the case has cited no decisions squarely
in point either from its own state or from any other jurisdiction.
The decision and opinion were based entirely on analogies drawn
from criminal cases, and special emphasis was placed upon a
recent criminal case decided by the same court. 2 The facts
in that case were very similar to the instant case. The defendant ran down and killed two little girls and then sped away
without -making any attempt to determine the severity of their
injuries or the consequences of the unfortunate accident. He
was apprehended and indicted for manslaughter and later found
guilty. In reviewing the case and affirming the decision reached
by the trial court, the opinion clearly stated, "the conduct of
the accused in leaving the bodies of his victims, struck down
by his automobile, there lying in the road while he sped on in his
car, may be considered by the jury in determining his guilt since
it tends, unexplained, to prove a consciousness of guilt."
The doctrine of the Connecticut court in admitting such evidence in a civil action for damages seems to have blazed the way
for like action by other states, for it has been followed in Louisiana where two cases arose involving this important question.
In the first 3 of two such cases, the defendant's car struck and
killed the plaintiff's decedent. Although the defendant attempted to flee he was followed and captured. In this case, as in
the instant case first discussed in this paper, there were no actual
eye witnesses to the tragedy itself, and the proof of the defendant's guilt was based almost entirely on his attempted flight.
No cases dealing with this question as relating to civil actions
were cited by the court, but it was stated in its opinion: "the
defendant's conduct in fleeing from the scene of the accident
1 Kotler v. Lalley, 151 At.
2
8

433 (Conn. 1930).
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490.

.Lagenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La. App. 272.
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after he struck the deceased and knocked him to the pavement
was reprehensible. He had been signalled to by the police officer,
he had pulled to the curb, but he then continued on his way
without stopping, showing that he must have felt that he was
entirely to blame for the accident and was obeying an impulse
to attempt to avoid its consequences. In the present case the
defendant is a representative of an educated class. He is a doctor, and certainly knew in his conscience that he was doing
wrong in running away from the scene of the accident, leaving
his victim prostrate upon a travelled street in danger of being
further injured or even killed by another vehicle."
In the second Louisiana case, 4 the court said: "Then, too,
the accident was caused by a truck and since no truck stopped,
either the driver of the truck which caused the death complained of was not keeping a proper lookout or he drove away
in an attempt to avoid the consequences of his part in the accident. If he had been careful in his observations surely he would
have noticed that the truck struck the lady with its front fender.
If he was not on the alert as he should have been he was negligent. If he did not know that he had struck someone and then
did not stop his actions in attempting to escape were tantamount to admissions of guilt. We have therefore come to the
conclusion that although the evidence as to the facts of the accident is very meager there is sufficient in the record to warrant
finding that decedent met her death because of being struck by
a truck and that the driver of that truck was at fault."
It is a well-established rule that the guilt of a person does
not have to be proved by the positive acts of the tort or the
crime itself. It may be shown by evidence which tends to prove
that defendant's conduct has been such as to invoke recognition
of the validity of the plaintiff's claim; thus evidence that defendant sought a release from liability, evidence of his withdrawal from contesting suit, or evidence of any act of defendant
which indicates a fear of unsuccessful issue of litigation is
admissible to prove plaintiff's case.5 It is also uncontroverted
that evidence which tends to show that defendant recognized
liability for damages caused by his negligent act and which
necessarily tends to show that such defendant did the act which
resulted in such liability is admissible." The entire doctrine
seems to be well stated in an Illinois case where the court said,
4 Vuillemot v. August J. Claverie & Co., 12 La. App. 236.
5Hussmann v. Leavell & Sherman, 20 S. W. (2d) 829 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929).
6 San Angelo Water, Light & Power Co. v. Baugh, 270 S. W. 1101
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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"the principle is well recognized that admissions may be implied
from conduct as well as expressed by words.' 7
It is accepted as a general rule that evidence which shows a
consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant may be introduced. Thus evidence was successfully introduced to show
that, after the accident which formed the basis of the case, the
defendant transferred his property to others. In affirming the
opinion of the trial court, the upper court stated, "Evidence
that the defendant transferred his property shortly after the
assault was properly admitted and correct instructions were
given by the court with regard to possible inferences which the
jury were entitled to draw from this action by the defendant. "8
Of course, such evidence should be limited to transactions which
are proximate in time and circumstance, as was pointed out by
the court in a Massachusetts case. The question arose as to
whether evidence of transfer of defendant's property was admissible to show his guilt and it was stated: "the conduct of
the defendant at a time when a year had passed since the accident which is the basis of plaintiff's claim is sought to be shown
as an admission of guilt. This conduct consisted in having his
automobile registered in the name of his daughter and we cannot say that, considering the period of time which had elapsed,
this was sufficient evidence to show a consciousness of liability so
as to amount to an admission."9
Many cases are available to show that the flight of the defendant after an accident or crime is not deemed to be conclusive evidence of guilt or of a consciousness of guilt. It is held,
and very properly so, the defendant may at all times bring in
evidence to rebut this presumption of guilt which might arise.
Among the acts of the defendant relevant to the showing of a
consciousness of guilt, flight has always held a prominent place
and it is easy to understand why the early law of ancient days
made the fact of flight conclusive evidence of guilt. But under
the more enlightened and rational system of modern times, the
fact of flight is considered as merely a circumstance tending to
show such consciousness of guilt and any relevant explanations
of his act may be offered by the defendant. 10
California has given us some very fine and clearly written
opinions on this matter. In one opinion," the court distinguished between evidence of flight as such and as part of the
7 Bell v. McDonald, 308 Ill. 329.
8 Carlin v. Toste, 149 Atl. 584 (R. I. 1930).

9Wilson v. Grace, 173 N. E. 524 (Mass. 1930).
10 State v. Hairston, 182 N. C. 851.
11 People v. Anderson, 57 Cal. App. 721.
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res gestae. "'The court did not err in permitting the plaintiff
to show all the circumstances attending the flight of the defendant from the scene of the accident. While the flight of a
defendant raises no presumption in law that he is guilty, it is
admissible in evidence as a circumstance to be weighed by the
jury as tending in some degree to prove consciousness of guilt
and is entitled to more or less weight according to the circumstances of the particular case. Evidence of flight is received
not as a part of the res gestae which concerns the accident
itself, but is indicative of a guilty mind. For the same reason
and for the same purpose, the events and circumstances connected with the flight of the accused are equally admissible
as a part of the res gestae of the flight itself. The defendant
may explain his flight and may show that it was entirely consistent with his innocence,--and in a like manner the plaintiff
may introduce evidence of the circumstances connected with the
flight which will strengthen his case by showing that it tends,
through its probative force, to indicate the guilt of the accused."
Another opinion, in explaining the phrase, "flight is evidence of
guilt," was careful not to preclude the defendant from rebutting the force of evidence of his flight. The court said, "The
fact of flight alone does not intimate that he is guilty nor that
there is evidence of guilt in such act alone. Instead it means
that if there is independent evidence of guilt then the fact of
flight is2 also admissible to show guilt and a consciousness of
guilt.'1
The question of the admissibility of flight as evidence of
guilt in civil cases has not been raised as yet in Illinois. It
has been presented many times in criminal cases and has been
allowed because of the prevalent contention that such conduct
on the part of the defendant is part of the res gestae and hence
admissible.
Several Illinois cases which accept this reason for allowing
such evidence to be admitted will suffice. Since they are all
criminal prosecutions, they do not form a strict parallel with
the instant case. In one prosecution, the defendant was charged
with manslaughter and, on the trial, evidence was introduced
showing that the defendant had fled from the scene after striking down the deceased. The defendant claimed that he had
fled because of the imminent danger of race prejudice in the
neighborhood and because he feared that he might be killed
if he had stopped to investigate the extent of the injuries
caused. The court in its opinion said, "In the prosecution of
an automobile driver who ran over and killed a pedestrian and
12

People v. Giancoll, 74 Cal. 642.
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did not stop to ascertain the extent of the injuries he had
caused, the jury may consider the fact of flight from the scene
as evidence of guilt, even though the defendant testifies he did
not stop because of his fear of race prejudice, since the jury
has a right to judge and consider whether the action was
controlled by a consciousness of guilt or was instead caused
by a justifiable fear on account of the alleged race prejudice."' 1
On another occasion an Illinois court held: "Flight of a defendant is a pertinent factor but any evidence may be introduced
tending to show that the flight was not from a fear or consciousness of guilt but was consistent with innocence. "14 Again,
in a very recent case, the highest court of this same state said,
"The flight of a defendant soon after the commission of an offense is proper legal evidence to show consciousness of guilt on
the part of the fleeing defendant."15
Thus we can plainly see that the Connecticut court in the
instant case, unsupported by reported decisions in any jurisdiction, has taken a decided step in the matter of evidentiary
rules and has "made law" on its own initiative when it allowed
such evidence of flight as admissible to show guilt in a civil
action. The attitude of the court is best explained by Chief Justice Wheeler, who wrote a dissenting opinion based on an entirely different reason. He said, "To permit the hit-and-run
driver under the circumstances present in this case to escape
civil liability for his wrong because the lips of his victim are
sealed in death is to give him the protection of *a rule of law
which only needs stating to show its fallacy. To say that the
plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, facts which
the conduct of the defendant has made inapplicable and impossible through his own act, would be a rule that in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as
unjust and inhuman."
The conduct of a party may always be given in evidence when
it tends to admit the fact in issue.' 6 Also, there can be little
doubt that, in general, flight is at least circumstantial evidence
of a guilty knowledge. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as being composed of facts which raise a logical inference
as to some fact in issue. A conviction may well be sustained
upon circumstantial evidence alone, but to warrant such con13 People v. Schwartz, 298 Ill. 218.
14 People v. Bundy, 295 IMl. 322.

15 People v. Levine, 342 Ill. 353.
16Farmers' State Bank & Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Refinery,
3 S. 'W. (2d) 65 (Tex. Comm. of App.).
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viction the proven facts must not only be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt but must clearly and satisfactorily exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. 17
Of course, it is evident that the question of whether or not
flight is an admission of guilt is in reality a matter of fact and
should be determined as such by the jury. Flight alone raises
no presumption of law that the defendant is guilty, but it is
admissible in evidence as a fact which may be considered by the
jury and from which they may draw an inference of guilt in
connection with other circumstances, in the absence of an explanation showing the reason or motive which prompted such
flight.' 8
In a Vermont case, the court said, "Flight of the accused
raises no presumption of law that the defendant is guilty, but
it is admissible in evidence as a fact which may be considered
by the jury and from which they may draw an inference that
the defendant is guilty."19 For the same purpose and reason,
the events and circumstances connected with the flight of the
accused are equally admissible.2 0 One should be careful to distinguish between mere going away from the scene of a crime
and actual flight. 21 Flight has been defined as the attempt to
evade the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing one's
self in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution of
criminal proceedings. 2 2 In legal parlance, this term signifies
not merely a leaving but means a leaving or concealment under
a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading apprehension and arrest. It is that consciousness and purpose which
gives to the act of flight its real incriminating character.
It cannot be said that there is no legal foundation for the decision of the Connecticut court in the instant case. Although, as
a general rule, acts subsequent in time to the principal event
will not be received in evidence, yet an act done after the happening of such principal event may be admissible in evidence
when it is so closely interwoven with the main event that,
taken together with the surrounding circumstances, it cannot
help but raise a reasonable presumption that such act was
caused by, or done under, the immediate influence of the principal transaction or event itself.23 Evidence of this nature,
17

United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803.

18 16 C. J. 1063.

19 State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149.
20 Johnson v. State, 120 Ga. 135.
21

Commonwealth v. Roland, 8 Phila. 606.

22 Terry v. State, 13 Ala. App. 115.
28 Pool v. Warren County, 123 Ga. 205.
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when introduced in a death case as in this instance, must
be viewed in the light of another generally recognized principle
of law. For it is a doctrine accepted in many jurisdictions that
where there are no eye witnesses to an accident and death results
to a participant which gives rise to a claim for damages for
wrongful death, less evidence is required to establish the plain24
tiff's case than if the decedent were alive and able to testify.
It was this underlying principle which moved the court to permit more weight to be placed on the circumstantial evidence and
the inferences that might have been drawn from the fact of
flight than if there had been witnesses to the accident and the
issues had been possible of determination by more positive evidence.
In the light of all the circumstances surrounding this accident
and the many similar ones which seem to be an inevitable
part of modern conditions, the writer believes that it cannot be
said that the court committed any injustice or error in permitting such evidence of flight as relevant and admissible in this
civil action. The conduct of the defendant is an evidentiary fact
and, if pertinent to the issue, will properly support the burden
of proof placed upon the plaintiff in such cases. Facts and
circumstances naturally resulting from the conduct and acts
which men consider a normal part in the affairs of life will
aid logically in determining a legal issue and should be deemed
legally relevant and of probative value. Many times it has
been stated that this, or words
of similar import, constitutes the
25
test of legal admissibility.
For a participant to attempt to flee 'from the scene of an
accident has been made a misdemeanor in Illinois among many
other states. 2 6 No one can doubt the advisability of such measures and we accept without hesitation the fact that such conduct is properly the basis of a criminal liability. It seems to
follow that there is no crying injustice in declaring that such
conduct should also become a basic part in the proof of civil
liability, although, of course, the defendant should always be
permitted to explain a seemingly damning act of incrimination.
Moreover, where a person by his own act has deprived another
of the possibility of testifying against him, the self-incriminating acts of the wrongdoer should be construed most strongly
against him. In substance, that is all that the Connecticut court
has done in this case and we certainly cannot hold such interpretation to be judicial error.
Brott v. Auburn & S. Electric Co., 220 N. Y. 92.
25Moffitt v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 527.
26 Smith-Hurd, Ill. Stat., 1929, Ch. 121, sec. 242a.
24
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The conclusions which we must draw are based on reported
cases not squarely in point. Instead, as we have seen, a precedent has been set and the way has been broken for decisions to
come. It is no longer disputed, and the authorities are in
accord, that flight may always be shown in a criminal prosecution. This has laid the foundation for the decision in the reported opinion as concerns the admissibility of ffight in evidence in a suit on the civil side. Now we know that in criminal
cases all presumptions and inferences are so construed as to
protect the right of the defendant to be deemed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court will always
strictly limit the scope of the evidence sought to be introduced
by the state so as to protect the defendant to the highest degree,
based on this right of the presumption of innocence. Since
this is so, we are in accord with a rule of evidence which will
permit evidence of flight in a civil suit, for here there are no
presumptions in favor of either party. We feel certain that the
holding of the Connecticut court will be followed as a just and
rational rule.
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT.--John Cleary, appellant, filed

his application with the Industrial Commission for an award
against his employer, F. Landon, doing business as the Landon
Cartage Company, on account of personal injuries. An arbitrator found with him. This finding was confirmed by the Industrial Commission but reversed in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and he brings it to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari."
Cleary was employed by Landon as a truck driver. On February 22, 1928, he was sent with three other drivers from Chicago
to Elk Grove, Illinois, where they unloaded about 5 P. M. and
started back for Chicago. There were four trucks in all. A
short way from Elk Grove, Cleary's truck slid into a ditch. He
secured a ride, overtook the other drivers, and they all attempted to extricate the truck to no avail. Upon calling their
employer, they were instructed to put lights on the truck and
leave it to be taken care of in the morning. Cleary was told
that he would be checked out and could go home-the others
were to check in their trucks at the company garage. Cleary
could have ridden into Chicago with them but said he would
beat them in, and so he shortly after secured a ride from a
passing automobile. About a mile from the end of the car line
1 Landon v. Industrial Commission, 341 Il.

51.
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this auto turned off and Cleary started to walk towards Chicago.
Soon the three trucks came along. It was dark and the drivers
did not see him. He hailed them but they did not hear. He
hopped onto the back end of the last truck. The driver did not
know he was there. After staying there for some time he became uncomfortable and instead of attracting the attention of
the driver, started to climb around the outside of the truck to
reach the cab. In doing so he slipped and fell under one of the
wheels and was badly injured.
The above facts present the question squarely-was Cleary
while so injured performing an act arising out of and in the
course of his employment? Was he performing a deed reasonably incidental to the duties for which he was hired? Was
there any causal connection between his employment-between
the conditions under which he was to work-and the resultant
damage ?
The court at the outset concedes that the question as to
whether an injury arises out of, and in the course of, an employment is one of fact 2 and that the commission can draw
reasonable inferences from those facts.3 It further concedes
that the employment is not always limited to the exact moment
when the actual work begins or ceases. But it must be something that is connected in causation, in time, place, and circumstances with the employment.4 In other words, it must be
either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment or an extraordinary one indirectly connected.3
But here there was no such causal connection. Cleary could
safely have come in with the other drivers. Instead of so doing
he, of his own accord, in order to "beat the others home" voluntarily selected a dangerous route. When an employee voluntarily increases the peril ordinarily incident to his employment, he projects himself beyond the scope of his duties and
his injury cannot be said to have arisen "out of, and in the
course of the employment. '" 6
At the outset, we are impressed by the magnitude of the
question. Almost every compensation act both in this country
and in England makes it a condition precedent to recovery
that the injury arise both "out of" and "in the course of" the
employment. To simplify our subject we shall consider each
76.
2 Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill.
378.
3Joyce-Watkins Co. v. Industrial Commission, 325 Ill.
4 Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11.
62.
5Boorde v. Industrial Commission, 310 Ill.
6 Lumaghl Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 318 Ill. 151; Dambold
377.
v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill.
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of these qualifications separately for they are by no means
synonymous terms.
Perhaps the clearest statement of a case of injuries arising out
is contained in the celebrated case of In Re
of the employment
McNico17 wherein the court said, in proposing a test for determining the point: "if the injury can be seen to have followed
as a natural incident of the work, and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with all the circumstances
as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the
employment, then it arises out of the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot be traced to the employment as
a contributing proximate cause, and which comes from a hazard
to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart
from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar
to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must
be incidental to the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen
or expected but after the event it must apear to have had its
origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have
flowed from that source as a rational consequence."
In Bryant v. Fissels the court said that an accident arises
"out of" the employment "when it is something the risk of
which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person
when entering the employment, as incidental to it." There
Fissell was employed by the defendant as a journeyman carpenter on his building. While so working, he was injured when
a heavy bar of metal fell on his head. The metal had been
caused to fall by a workman of an independent contractor who
had work on the same building. The Court held that the injury
arose out of the employment regardless of the fact that a third
person had been instrumental in propelling the bar.
In Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper9 the plaintiff, a workman of
the defendant, injured his eye whan a "cotton burr" struck
him. He lost one-half day because of this accident. On returning to work, he found that the eye still bothered him. He was
advised that he ought to go to specialist and received the employer's permission to go to another town for treatment. He
drove there in his own car and started home when a collision
occurred and he was injured. The court held that this was a
risk not incidental to the employment and that no causal connection existed. It was a danger common to the neighborhood.
7 215 Mass. 497.
8 84 N. J. L. 72.
9 294 Pac. 108 (Oklahoma 1930).
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Perhaps the most revolutionary of the more recent opinions
on this subject is that of the court in the case of Charlotte Burr
Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp.'0 In that case a Yellow Cab
chauffeur was commandeered by an officer of the law to chase
a fleeing felon. While doing so there was a collision and he
was killed. The court in awarding compensation said, "The
danger of being called upon by the law to pursue one escaping
from the law is one of the risks of a chauffeur's employment,
insofar as it is incidental to the management of an automobile,
is incidental to his service, is foreseeable if not foreseen, and is
covered by the workmen's compensation act."' 1
In contrast with the single standard set up in the previous
requirement, our norm for determining when an injury arises
"in the course of the employment" seems rather complicated,
but irons itself out in analysis. "In the course of' -relates
to the time, place, and conduct. Chartres says, in his Judicial
Interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Laws," "The test
as to the course of the employment is triple-as to time, conduct,
and place." As the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Dietzen
case case supra said, "The Accident must be suffered in the
course of the employment in the doing of something which the
employee may reasonably be doing during that time to do that
thing." The injury must arise not only "out of" but in the
"course of the employment"-as these words are used conjunctively in the statute and the circumstances of the accident must
come within both requirements. '12
In that case an employee was engaged in polishing metal
pieces on a buffing wheel and was warned not to get into an
exhaust pipe just back of his machine. He dropped a piece he
was polishing and went and reached into the exhaust pipe to
recover it and was injured. The court ruled that the Act did
not apply.
As a general rule, the employment does not begin and the
relation of employer and employee does not commence until the
10250 N. Y. 14.
It See also Angerstein, The Employer and the Workmen's Compensation act of Illinois (1930 Ed.) pp. 162-167; Honald, On Workmen's
Compensation, sec. 113; Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11;
Board of Education v. Industrial Commission, 321 Ill. 23; Morris & Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill. 49; Jones Foundry and Machine Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 312 Ill. 27; White Star Motor Coach Lines
v. Industrial Commission, 336 Ill. 117; Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
Davis, 64 Ind. App. 227; Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill. 141; Superior Smokeless Coal & Mining Co. v. Hise, 89
Oki. 70.
12 Pp. 137-9. see also In Re McNicol; In Re Loper, 64 Ind. App. 571;
Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 333 Ill. 340.
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employee has reached the place of employment or arrives on the
employer's premises, and it ceases when he leaves those premises. This is well illustrated in the case of Gilroy v. Standard
Oil Co. 13 where an employee working in a factory completed
his work and went out to the gate of the premises to ride with
a fellow employee. They had just stepped into the car and
started along the street in the auto when an explosion which
occurred in the factory pumphouse injured him. The court
found that he had ceased his work, and denied him compensation.
In Paris v. Whitmore, Rauber and Vicinus,14 the employer
was constructing a sewer, and the plaintiff was working as one
of the gang. The plaintiff and the rest of the men were wont
to ride to and from work on a truck of the company-with the
driver's permission, though against the foreman's orders. The
truck was parked in the street nearby. In getting on the truck
after 5 P. m. the plaintiff was injured. The court held that the
work had ceased and that the compensation act would not apply.
In Eimer v. Miller,15 the plaintiff was an employee who, together with a fellow employee, the son of the employer-a contractor-worked after regular hours on a building. After the
work was finished, they started home in Miller's car, but a collision occurred. The court held that the plaintiff had completed
his work and that the Act would not apply.
Bradbury, in his book on Worknan's Compensation, says:
"A general rule in construing the Workman's Compensation
Act appears to be that a man's employment does not begin till
he has reached the place where he has to work or the scene
16
of his duty and does not continue after he has left.'
The rigidity of the above rule has been somewhat relaxed,
however, in the more modern cases, so that now "employment is
not limited to the exact moment when the worker reaches the
place where he is to begin work and the moment when he ceases
to work. It includes a reasonable amount of time and space
before and after ceasing actual employment, having in mind all
the circumstances. ,,17
Witness the case of Indian Hill Club v. Tndustrial Commission,' s where the employee was a caddy who, finding his number
13151 Atl. 598 (N. J. 1930).
14 243 N. Y. Supp. 622.
15 255 Ill. App. 465.
16 Third Edition, p. 468.
17 Chartres on Judicial Interpretation
pp. 137-9.
18309 111. 271.
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low on the caddy list, started to go home. When he had almost
reached the street but was on the grass about three feet from
the driveway on the Club's grounds, he was struck by an auto
using the private driveway of the club. In awarding compensation the court said: "It is not essential to the right to receive
compensation that the employee should have been working at
the particular time when the injury was received. The employment is not limited to the exact moment when he begins work or
when he quits work."19
It is well settled that the liability of an employer does not end
promptly at the time for quitting work where the employee is
still on the premises and engaged in work for the employer-or
if he is changing his clothes or taking a bath in the bathhouse
provided by the employer. In Franklin Coal and Coke Co. v.
Industrial Commission,20 an employee was shot by a fellow
employee while he was in the bathhouse after quitting hours.
The court awarded compensation.
It is also true that the time of employment extends beyond the
regular hours where the employment is not one of set schedule,
or where the employer requests the employee to do extra work,
even though it be off the premises. In Bisdom v. Kerbrat,21
the employer was a landscape gardener who employed a man to
superintend jobs and assist in soliciting them. The usual quitting time was 5:30 P. M. But on the day in question, they quit
at 4:30 and the employee was requested to go home, change his
clothes, eat, and return to solicit business with the employer.
He was killed on the way home. The court held that the Act
applied. The injuries arose out of the employment, regardless
of the fact that the regular hours were over.
In Merriman v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore,22 a sales engineer's superior had instructed him to meet with another
employee at the company's office on Sunday morning for a conference. The other employee called for the plaintiff in his car.
On the way to the office an accident happened. The court, saying that he was working at the time and furthering his master's
interest, awarded compensation.
The fundamental basis from which we consider the question
of place in awarding compensation rests on the general doctrine
that the relation of master and servant is suspended when the
servant, at the end of the day's work, leaves the place of his
19 See
20 322
21 251
22 251

also Wabash Ry. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 119.
Ill. 23.
Mich. 316.
Mich. 318.
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actual employment and is resumed when the servant puts himself in a position where he can do the work at the place where
it is to be performed. 23 And so injuries while the employee
is
24
going to and from work are not usually compensible.
However, to this general rule there are exceptions. The
weight of authority seems to be that if the employer furnishes
transportation for his employee as an incident of the employment, or as a part of the contract of employment, an injury
suffered by the employee while going to and coming from the
place of employment in the vehicle furnished by the employer
and under his control arises out of, and in the course of, the
employment. 25
One of the leading cases on this subject is Donovan's Case. 26
Here the court points out that the liability of the master
depends upon whether the conveyance has been provided by him
after the real beginning of the employment, in compliance with
one of the implied or express terms of the contract for the mere
use of the employees, and is one which the employees are
required or as a matter of right are permitted to use by virtue
of that contract.
In Harrison v. Central Construction Corporation27 the court
said "The second is that where the workman is employed to
work at a certain place, and as a part of his contract of employment there is an agreement that his employer shall furnish him
free transportation to and from his work, the period of service
continues during the time of transportation, and if an injury
occurs during the course of transportation it is held to have
arisen out of and in the course of the employment." So also
when, particularly in railroad cases, the injured is hurt while
crossing tracks on the only route to and from the place of
employment. 28 Or, where the duties of the employment carry
him beyond the premises of the employer as in the case of
J. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission.2 9 A traveling man
was injured by an auto while attempting to board a street car
to go to his employer's factory to report sales and get instructions after returning from a trip. It was held that the injury
arose out of the employment. It was held in Klumpp v. Indus23 Rourke's Case, 237 Mass. 360.
24 Podgorski v. Kerwin, 144 Minn. 313.
25 Fisher v. Tide Water Building Co., 97 N. J. L. 324.
26 217 Mass. 76.
27135 Md. 170.
28 Ludwig v. Farmers' Shipping Ass'n., 231 N. W. 803 (Minn. 1930).
Schweiss v. Industrial Commission, 292 I1. 90.
29 301 I1. 76.
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trial Accident Commission"° that an employer could not defeat
liability for compensation because the painter who contracted
to paint a store was puttying holes in awning gable which
formed a party wall when the accident happened. He was
still in the service of the employer.
In the case of T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Tanner,3 1 the deceased
was an employee of a tie company engaged in stenciling some
ties on a barge which was floating beside the ship Osceola alongside the wharf. When dinner time came, he had to get up on the
Osceola first, then proceed to the wharf. There were only two
ways of going-one up a rope, and the other to be transported
in a sling operated by a winch on the ship. He was killed when
he fell from the sling. The court held that either way was
equally dangerous and that he was entitled to compensation.
One of the most interesting cases on this subject is that of
City of Wcst Bend v. Schoelmer.3 2 It seems that the Wisconsin
Statutes of 1929 provide that "every employee going to and
from employment in the ordinary way while on the premises
of the employer shall be deemed to be performing services growA volunteer fireing out of, and incidental to, employment."
man while on the premises of his employer took the employer's
truck in answer to an alarm and was injured before reaching
the firehouse where he was to get his fire truck. The injury
occurred after he had left the premises of the employer and
while he was on the streets of the town. As a volunteer, he had
no regular hours, but was subject to call at any time. The
court held that the city (not his civil employer) would have to
pay him compensation, regardless of the fact that he had not
yet reached the fire barns.
In general, a street injury arises out of the employment when
the employer's work requires his use of the road or when his
use of the street is a special exposure in the course of an emploment sending him into the street. The injury must not be
occasioned by an accident to which every person using the highway is equally imperiled. The special exposure must result
from the nature of the employment, and it must not be such
that the fact of his birth or existence would be just as apt to be
the origin of the peril as the fact of the employment.
An excellent discussion of this point is contained in Olree v.
White Star Refining Co. 3 3 wherein the plaintiff, a landscape
50 291 Pac. 456, (Cal. App. 1930).
31 44 Fed. (2d) 928.
32 232 N. W. 524 (Wis. 1930).
See also Stocker v. Southfield Co., 244 Mich. 13;
33 252 Mich. 33.
Kyle v. Greene High School, 208 Iowa 1037; Phifer's Dependents v.
Foremost Dairy, et al., 200 N. C. 65.
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gardener was given compensation for death resulting from a
train colliding with his automobile while he was traveling from
Ann Arbor to Detroit. He lived in Detroit and after leaving
the place of his present work at Ann Arbor was driving toward
his home. He usually turned in balance sheets at the Detroit
office either in the evening or in the morning before starting
out. The court said the employment did not cease till he had
reached his home.
These in general are some of the more fundamental maxims
of the rule of place. The elements of time and place are closely
linked, and where one element satisfies the requirements of our
standard the other will usually be found to synchronize.
The greatest bone of contention lies in the consideration of
conduct. To the general rule, so aptly stated in the Dietzen
case, that the employee-whether on or off the premises-must
be doing something in furtherance of his master's business,
there are many exceptions. Accidents in connection with getting pay checks, 4 the violation and disobedience of orders, acts
in emergency, 35 fights and assaults of employees,3 6 horseplay,3 7
and many other questions arise and vary the workings of the
general rule and come in for special consideration, but are too
detailed to be considered in this treatise.
But there is one division which we must consider, as it forms
the very basis of the decision in the Landon case, namely, the
incurring of unreasonable danger or hazard by the employee, the
increasing of his own peril by the performance of acts that are
unnecessary and unforseeable and having little or no connection
with the duties of the job at hand.
We may divide these into internal and external, the internal
being the mere volunteering of a workman to perform some act
in trying to further his master's interest which is not incidental
to his own employment, and the external-the doing of something voluntarily not in furtherance of that master's interests.
A volunteer has been defined to be "one who introduces himself into matters which do not concern him, and does, or undertakes to do, something which he is not bound to do or which is
not in pursuance or protection of any interest of the master or
which is undertaken in the absence of any peril requiring him
to act as in an emergency. "' 3 8
84
85

Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill.
53.
Baum v. Industrial Commission, 288 Il1. 516.
Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill.
31.

38
37 Payne v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill.
388.
38 Kelly v. Tyra, 103 Minn. 176.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

This is perhaps a little too broad. In the Dietzen case which
is perhaps one of the clearest volunteer cases of record, the
plaintiff was undoubtedly trying to further his master's interests but the court held that when a man steps out of the sphere
of his employment to do something he is not expected to do or
required to do he does so at his own peril, regardless of his
good intentions.
Likewise, in Hyatt v. United States Rubber Reclaiming Co.3 9
an employee was injured while operating a rip saw in a department other than his own in violation of a rule. The court held
that even though he was acting in the interest of his employer
he could not collect compensation. "For," they said, "sometimes the disobedience of an order may do more than establish
the fault of the employee-it may go so far as to place him outside the scope of his employment."
In considering increasing the risks by voluntary acts not in
the interest of the employer, we come to the gist of the Landon
case. For a long time in England and its colonies the rule has
been that "There is no causal connection between an accident
and the employment when the accident is due to an added peril
to which a workman by his own conduct exposes himself, where
the peril is not one involved in his contract of service. "40
Thus, in Barnes v. Nunnery Colliery Company, 41 a boy
employed in a colliery, noticing that an endless rope, having a
number of tubs attached to it, was about to start for a level where
his work was to be performed, jumped into the front tub in
order to ride to his work instead of walking as he should have
done. He was killed when a tub struck the top of the mine.
The court denied compensation saying he came to his death
through a new and added peril to which he, by his own conduct,
exposed himself, not through any peril which his contract of
service directly or indirectly exposed him to.
Baker v. Bradford,42 is a similar case. The injured, instead
of waiting for the stop block, which was customarily let down
to keep the mining tubs in place-to be positioned, attempted
to cross between two tubs before the stop block was down. He
was killed. The court held he had added to his own peril and
denied compensation to his widow.
In Black v. Hesperides,43 a sailor was drowned while returning from the shore to his ship across some barges which lay
89 243 N. Y. Supp. 474.
40Elliott's Workmen's Compensation Acts 9th Edition p. 88.

4181 L. J. K. B. 213.
42 85 L. J. K. B. 1031.
43 (1929) W. C. and I. Rep. 383.
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between the ship and the quay, although a boat and a boatman
had been provided by the employers for the use of the crew for
that purpose. The court held that even though the passage
across the barges was known and acquiesced in by the owners
and ship's officers, the injury did not arise out of, and in the
course of, the employment.
In Martin v. Fullerton & Company,44 a seaman chose to jump
from the quay to his ship instead of using the proper gangway,
and fell into the water and drowned. The court denied compensation. In Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company v.
Highley,45 the plaintiff crawled under a supposedly dead train
while on his way to get hot water for breakfast, while on the
job. There were two other safe ways to go to his destination.
The court said that there could be no award because of the
voluntary increase in the peril, saying it was "a peril voluntarily superinduced on what arose out of the employment and
cumulative to it, to which the workman was neither required
nor had any authority to expose himself."
The American cases upon this subject are not so numerous.
Perhaps the doctrine is most clearly illustrated in Lena Kraft v.
West Hotel Company.4 6 Therein a chambermaid who was furnished a room in a hotel, but who was not subject to call at night,
was curling her hair clandestinely at night. She was severely
burned. The court held that this was an added peril to which
she exposed herself, and denied compensation.
In DeRosa v. Levering and GarriguesCompany,47 a structural
iron worker had completed work on a job and was told to report
for work next morning at another town. The next morning the
employee left his work on a motorcycle, picked up a fellow
employee, and was proceeding to a new job when the accident
occurred. When employees were shipped from one town to
another they were paid whatever the railway fare was. A tire
blew out and both were killed. The court held that it was not in
the contemplation of the employer that he should use this means
of transportation and that he should not be held accountable
for the peril they had added to their journey.
Perhaps our own Illinois case of White Star Motor Coach
Lines v. Industrial Commisison,48 will prove a clear exemplar
(1908) S. C. 1030, 45. S. L. R. 812.
W. C. Reports 244. See also Brice v. Edward Lloyd, Ltd., 2 K. B.
804; Williams v. Wigan Coal & Iron Co., 3 B. 65; Kane v. Merry and
Cunningham, Ltd., S. C. 533, 48 S. L. R. 430.
46 193 Iowa 1288.
47 151 Atl. 246 (Conn. 1930).
48 336 Ill. 117.
44

45
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of the principle. In that case, the duties of the deceased were
to drive a motor bus with a route ending at Henry, Illinois, and
starting from there again at 7:30 A. m. The bus broke down
some distance out of Henry.
"He phoned the office for the
repairman or mechanic who came after considerable delay.
They tried to repair the bus but were unable to do so and the
deceased rode to Peoria in the mechanic's car, arriving about
4:30 A. m. They ate at a restaurant and then went to the company garage. There were extra busses in the garage and the
deceased crawled into one of them to snatch an hour's sleep.
The motor was running and he was asphyxiated. The court
said that the employer is not intended as an insurer of his men.
"But where the employee incurs a danger of his own choosing
and one altogether beyond any reasonable requirement of his
employment, it cannot be said that such a risk was an incident
of that employment."
We think that statement to be conclusive of the facts in the
Landon case. The position of our court is further strengthened
by able opinions in the cases of White City Amusement Company v. Industrial Commission,4 9 where the employee needlessly
crossed from one hoist on the "chutes" to another and was
injured; of St. Louis and O'Fallon Coal Company v. Industrial
Cmmission 5o where an employee chose a path that was dangerous and along a through line track in preference to the safer
route provided; of Weis Paper Mitl Company v. Industrial
Commission,5 1 where the court flatfootedly reversed an award
because the claimant chose an unnecessarily dangerous place (a
switch track) whereon to catch his daily siesta; and in the case
of Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis v. Industrial
Commission,52 wherein, as in the Martin v. Fullerton case, the
employee chose to crawl beneath a box car without any necessity.
We therefore conclude that the Landon case is well supported
by authority in Ilinois, in the country at large, and wherever
the common law system of jurisprudence prevails. The question
as to what constitutes an injury arising out of, and in the scope
of, the employment is as broad as the jurisdictions which interpret its meaning, but we may always turn to those principles
of causal connection, time, place, and conduct to guide us to a
decision.
331 Il. 541.
50 321. Ill.
117.
51 293 Ill.284.
52 309 Ill.203.
49

